|
|
The Naturalistic Fallacy involves two ideas, which sometimes
appear to be linked, but may also be teased apart: Appeal to Nature.
One aspect of the Naturalistic Fallacy is the (false) idea that whatever is
natural cannot be wrong. Hence, if we can find an example of a certain
behavior "in nature," then that behavior should be acceptable for human
beings.
Deriving 'ought' from 'is'. Another aspect of the Naturalistic
Fallacy is a move from a "fact," i.e. a declarative or descriptive
utterance, to an imperative or prescriptive utterance. The
conclusion may be about moral duties or about ideal states of affairs; but the unstated
(and false) premiss is that we must always accept things as they are. In
some cases, this may very difficult to distinguish from the fallacy of
Appeal to Tradition. |
|
|
The Naturalistic Fallacy gets much of its force from a
feeling that we cannot condemn anything that is "natural." Perhaps this
feeling comes from the fact that, in general, we do not make moral judgments
outside the scope of human affairs. Many species survive by engaging in
behavior that we would not like to see in humans. My favorite example is the
mite Adactylidium in which the young are never laid as eggs. Rather,
they hatch inside the mother's body, and then eat her from the inside out!
We make no moral judgment, because it is, after all, "nature." However, once we have acquired the habit of refraining from moral judgments
outside the human realm, the Naturalistic Fallacy then tries to convince us
that we ought to condone, within the context of human affairs, whatever can
be described as "natural." "Nature" may mean, of course,
other species, but it may also include humans in a more "natural" state
(i.e. non-civilized human societies.) The claim that something is "natural"
may even just be an appeal to human nature, civilized or not. For
example, in The African Queen Humphrey Bogart tries to justify his
drinking of rum by saying, "Have a heart, miss. It's in me nature." (To
which Katherine Hepburn replies, "Nature, Mr. Ornat, is what we were put
into this world to rise above!")
David Hume is the philosopher most associated with the
principle that one cannot validly derive an "ought" statement from an "is"
statement, although G. E. Moore made good use of this principle in his
Principia Ethica. The principle is sound, of course. From the claim that a ring is
made of gold it does not directly follow that the ring is valuable.
We must also know that gold is valuable.
On the other hand, "ought"
arguments do often turn on a consideration of facts. Whether we should spend
more on education may depend on specific facts about student performance.
Whether we should spend more on the military depends on specific facts about
the current state of the military and upon specific facts about threats to
this country. Hence, one way to reason badly is to propose an argument in
which the relevant facts are omitted or misrepresented. An argument that
appeals to well-established facts is much more likely to be good reasoning
than one that does not.
Moreover, the distinction between facts and values is not always clear
cut. If I say "This steel beam is strong," I probably mean that it is strong
enough to serve some purpose, such as supporting a bridge. I am, in
short, judging its value to someone concerned with building a good bridge.
The concept of "strength" seems objective enough, but it is actually quite
value-laden. Good reasoning recognizes this subtle interplay between fact
and value.
The Naturalistic Fallacy mimics good reasoning by claiming to be
"factually based," i.e. by appealing to well-established facts, but it is
doing so in a context in which a choice of ideals is actually the
issue. It does not so much recognize the interplay between fact and value as
try to reduce questions of value to questions of fact. |